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Abstract
In this Note, the legal basis of the United States position will be evaluated. After an overview
of the events surrounding the controversy, the sources of the General Assembly’s budgetary and
apportioning authority and the United Nations’ budget procedures will be considered. There will
follow a discussion of an International Court of Justice advisory opinion upon which both the
United States and its opponents rely. Finally, the financial arrangement between the United Na-
tions and the Preparatory Commission (Commission) will be examined in light of the formal rela-
tionship between those two bodies.
UNITED NATIONS FINANCING OF THE LAW OF THE SEA
PREPARATORY COMMISSION: MAY THE UNITED STATES
WITHHOLD PAYMENT?
INTRODUCTION
For the second time in United Nations history, a significant
legal challenge has been made to the General Assembly's authority
to compel a member to help finance an approved expenditure.' In
an effort to promote its policy agenda 2 by using its leverage as the
United Nations' largest contributor, 3 the United States has refused
to pay its assessed share of the costs of a preparatory commission
which will begin to implement controversial parts of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Convention). 4 The
United States position was announced in a statement by President
1. On numerous occasions, nations have refused to pay validly apportioned charges to
the United Nations or its specialized agencies for policy reasons. A recent example is the
United States withholding of funds from the International Atomic Energy Agency, which
was prompted by that agency's refusal to recognize Israel's credentials. Statement of Secre-
tary of State George Shultz (Oct. 16, 1982), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1982, at 63.
In this instance, however, the legal authority of the United Nations to compel payment was
not challenged. Id. The only precedent for such a challenge on legal grounds is a refusal by
France and the Soviet Union to pay an assessment for United Nations peacekeeping forces in
the late 1950's and early 1960's. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
2. Withholding and deferral of payments to the United Nations and related agencies
have been used by the United States to promote fiscal restraint in the United Nations budget,
see Wall St. J., May 1, 1981, at 29, col. 3, and to thwart Arab efforts to oust Israel from the
General Assembly, the International Telecommunication Union, and the International
Atomic Energy Agency. Statement of Secretary of State George Shultz, supra note 1. See also
Marshall, Rattling the Purse at the United Nations, 218 SCIENCE 456 (Oct. 29, 1982); Wall St.
J., Oct. 18, 1982, at 3, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
Such tactics by the United States are not unprecedented. In 1976, the United States
suspended payments to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) when that body cut off funding to Israel. See Russell, Playing International
Hardball, TIME, Nov. 1, 1982, at 47. The American delegation to the International Labor
Organization (ILO) withdrew from 1977 until 1979 in response to criticism of United States
Mideast policy. Id.
3. The United States regularly contributes 25% of the United Nations' budget. See, e.g.,
Report of the Committee on Contributions, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 11) at 55, U.N. Doc.
A/37/11 (1982). The next largest contributor is the Soviet Union with 11.1% for the years
1980-1982. Id. Seventy-one nations paid the minimum 0.01% for the same period. Id. at 52-
55. See also Advances to the Working Capital Fund and Contributions to the United Nations
Regular Budget for 1982 and of New Member States' Contributions for 1980 and 1981, U.N.
Doc. ST/ADM/SER.B/258, at 8-11 (1982).
4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Convention].
UNITED NATIONS FINANCING
Reagan, 5 who declared that the assessment is improper under the
United Nations Charter and not legally binding on members.,
In this Note, the legal basis of the United States position will be
evaluated. After an overview of the events surrounding the contro-
versy,7 the sources of the General Assembly's budgetary and appor-
tioning authority 8 and the United Nations' budget procedures9 will
be considered. There will follow a discussion of an International
Court of Justice advisory opinion upon which both the United
States and its opponents rely. 10 Finally, the financial arrangement
between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission
(Commission) will be examined in light of the formal relationship
between those two bodies."
I. THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION
The Preparatory Commission was established simultaneously
with the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, ' 2 a multilateral treaty negotiated over a nine year period at
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Con-
ference). 13 The Conference was convened in 1973 by resolution of
5. Statement of President Ronald W. Reagan (Dec. 30, 1982), reprinted in United States
Mission to the United Nations, Press Release No. USUN 1-(83) (Jan. 3, 1983). See N.Y. Times,
Dec. 31, 1982, at 1, col. 5.
6. Statement of President Ronald W. Reagan, supra note 5. A fact sheet accompanying
President Reagan's statement framed the issue in these terms:
The expenses of the Law of the Sea Preparatory Commission are not expenses [of the
United Nations] since that commission is legally independent of and distinct from
the UN Organization.
The [Law of the Sea] Preparatory Commission is established pursuant to a
treaty regime separate from the UN Charter . . . . [It] is not a subsidiary organ of
the UN. It is not answerable to the United Nations. Membership in the UN does not
obligate any member to finance or to otherwise support any other organization.
Fact Sheet accompanying United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release No.
USUN 1-(83) (Jan. 3, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Fact Sheet].
7. See infra notes 12-42 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 44-47, 57-60 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 48-56, 61-74 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 78-144 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 145-206 and accompanying text.
12. See Draft Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
para. 42, 21 I.L.M. 1245, 1252 (1982) (resolution integral part of Convention) [hereinafter
cited as Final Act]; id. annex I, res. I, at 1253-54 (establishing Preparatory Commission)
[hereinafter cited as Conference Resolution I].
13. For a summary of the work of the Conference, see Final Act, supra note 12.
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the General Assembly 4 with a mandate to adopt a convention
addressing all matters relating to the law of the sea. 15 The Assembly
provided financing for the Conference by authorizing the Secre-
tary-General to provide facilities, servicing and staff, utilizing "to
the fullest extent possible the resources at his disposal." l6 Confer-
ence expenses were assessed to United Nations members as part of
the regular United Nations budget,' 7 and special provision was
made for assessment to states not members of the United Nations
that participated in the Conference.18
As the negotiations neared completion, the Conference Presi-
dent proposed that a preparatory commission be established to
enable organs created by the Convention to function as soon as
possible upon its entry into force.'9 The earliest discussions regard-
14. G.A. Res. 3067, para. 2, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 13, 14, U.N. Doe. A/
9030 (1973).
15. Id. para. 3. The original timetable called for the Conference to end no later than
1975, id. para. 4, but owing to the enormity of the undertaking, see G.A. Res. 2750C, para.
2, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 26, 26, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); Report of the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 21) para. 23, U.N. Doc. A/8721 (1972)
(agenda of the Conference), and the difficulty of achieving consensus, see, e.g., Report of the
Chairman of the First Committee, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.62/L.91 (1982) (describing difficulty of
United States negotiating position), the Conference required nine years (11 sessions) of
substantive negotiation. See G.A. Res. 36/79, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 23, U.N.
Doc. A/36/51 (1981); G.A. Res. 35/116, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 19, U.N. Doe. A/
35/48 (1980); G.A. Res. 34/20, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1979); G.A. Res. 33/17, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978);
G.A. Res. 32/194, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 42, U.N. Doe. A/32/45 (1977); G.A. Res.
31/63, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 23, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976); G.A. Res. 3483, 30
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/10,034 (1975); G.A. Res. 3334, 29 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 10, U.N. Doe. A/9631 (1974) (convening additional sessions).
16. G.A. Res. 3067, supra note 14, para. 9.
17. See, e.g., Programme Budget for the Biennium 1982-1983, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 6A) annex II, at 2, U.N. Doe. A/36/6/Add.1 (1982); Programme Budget for the Bien-
nium 1980-1981, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 6A) at 7, U.N. Doe. A/34/6/Add.2 (1980);
Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 1980-1981, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 6) at
128-32, U.N. Doc. A/34/6 (1979). For a description of the process by which appropriations
provided in the regular budget are assessed to member states, see infra notes 62-71 and
accompanying text.
18. G.A. Res. 31/407, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 201, U.N. Doe. A/31/39 (1976).
United Nations financial regulations provide that nonmember states which participate in
conferences financed from United Nations appropriations shall contribute to such conferences
at rates to be determined by the General Assembly. Financial Regulations and Rules of the
United Nations, reg. 5.9, U.N. Doe. ST/SGB/Financial Rules/1/Rev.2/Amend.2, at 16
(1980), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS FINANCE MANUAL § 1.00, at 13 (1981).
19. Note by the President (March 3, 1980), para. 3(a), U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/PC/1,
reprinted in Report of the President on the Work of the Informal Plenary on the Preparatory
Commission, annex I, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.62/L.55 (1980).
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ing creation of the commission involved two matters pertinent to
the present discussion. First, some nations objected to a proposal to
limit membership on the commission to states ratifying or signing
the Convention.2 0 Second, it was recognized that according to
United Nations practice, the appropriate means of financing the
commission would be with a loan provided by the United Nations,
to be repaid by the new organization. 21 By the end of the ninth
session, the draft Conference Resolution 22 provided that member-
ship on the Preparatory Commission should be limited to states
signing or acceding to the Convention.2 3 Provision was also made
for financing the Commission through a United Nations loan.
2 4
Before the tenth session began, the Reagan administration
assumed office in the United States. 25 The new administration op-
posed major portions of the draft Convention, 2  and refused to
20. Report of the President on the Work of the Informal Plenary on the Preparatory
Commission, para. 4(c), U.N. Doe. A/Conf.62/L.55 (1980) ("Some felt that composition
based on signature to the Final Act was important to ensure broad and representative
membership in the preparatory commission."). See First Committee, 15 Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea Official Records [UNCLOS III OR] (50th mtg.),
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.1/SR.50 (prov. ed. 1981).
21. Report of the President on the Work of the Informal Plenary on the Preparatory
Commission, supra note 20, annex I, para. 3(i) ("According to United Nations practice, such
expenses are met by a loan provided by the United Nations. ... ); id. para. 4(j) ("the
financing . . . should be in conformity with United Nations practice").
22. Informal Proposal of the President of the Conference, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/PC/2
(1980), reprinted in Report of the President, supra note 20, annex II.
23. Id. para. 2.
24. Id. para. 12.
25. President Reagan was sworn into office on January 20, 1981. The tenth session
convened on March 9, 1981. G.A. Res. 35/116, para. 3, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 19,
19, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980).
26. See Law of the Sea- Tenth Session: Miscellaneous Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Part 1, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 633, 640-52 (1981) (statement of James L. Malone, Assistant Secretary of
State Designate for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs), re-
printed in DEP'T ST. BULL., July 1981, at 48.
Opposition centered on part XI of the Convention, which provides that the area "at or
beneath the sea-bed" and minerals found therein "are the common heritage of mankind,"
Convention, supra note 4, arts. 133, 136, and establishes an International Sea-Bed Authority
with exclusive jurisdiction to organize and control all activity in such areas. See id. arts. 137,
para. 3 & 156-157. See Statement of President Ronald Reagan (July 9, 1982), reprinted in
DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 1982, at 71.
The head of the American delegation to the ninth session of the Conference (held in 1980
under the Carter administration) had stated that it would "support provisions that encourage
the earliest practicable entry into force of the convention." Letter dated 30 July 1980 from the
representative of the United States of America to the President of the Conference, 14
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continue negotiations until it had completed a comprehensive re-
view of the document.2 7 As a result, the substantive work of the
Conference was virtually suspended through the tenth sbssion. 28
However, the tenth session did receive the report of the Secretary-
General on financial implications of the proposed Convention,
which included the projected cost of the Preparatory Commission.2 9
Work on the draft Conference Resolution continued between
the tenth and eleventh sessions of the Conference. 30 During this
period, financing of the Commission from the regular budget of the
United Nations was inserted as an alternative to the loan provi-
sion. 31 This scheme would shift the major burden of funding the
Commission from the Convention signatories directly to the largest
contributors to the United Nations. 32 The industrialized nations
would thus bear the bulk of the Preparatory Commission's costs
regardless of whether they signed the Convention. 33 Some of the
UNCLOS III OR 109, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/103 (1982). The Reagan administration sup-
ported the bulk of the Convention, see Statement of President Ronald Reagan, supra, but
ratification with reservation was expressly prohibited. Convention, supra note 4, art. 309.
27. Report of the Chairman of the First Committee, para. 22, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/
L.91 (1982). See also Statement of James L. Malone, supra note 26.
28. Report of the Chairman of the First Committee, supra note 27, para. 23.
29. Potential Financial Implications for States Parties to the Future Convention on the
Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/L.65 (1981). A partial estimate of the cost of the
proposed Preparatory Commission exceeded U.S.$1.2 million. Id. para. 58 n.c and accompa-
nying text. The U.S.$1.2 million estimate does not include provision for subsidiary commit-
tees, id. para. 54, and does not account for the additional expenses involved in conducting the
meetings away from United Nations Headquarters in New York. Id. paras. 55-56. The
Commission was convened at Kingston, Jamaica. Provisional Verbatim Record (193d plen.
mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/PV.193, at 21 (1983). The estimate was based on a total of 20
weeks of meetings. Potential Financial Implications for States Parties to the Future Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, supra, para. 53 n.*.
It is noteworthy that new funding provisions were inserted just a few months after these
expense projections were received. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
30. The draft resolution was developed between sessions by the Working Group of 21,
co-chaired by the President of the Conference and the Chairman of the First Committee.
Their work is summarized in the Report of the Co-ordinators of the Working Group of 21,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.1/L.30 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Working Group of 21 Report].
31. Draft Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the International
Sea-Bed Authority and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, para. 11, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.62/WG.21/Informal Paper 15 (1981). The important difference between the
new financing plan and the loan scheme is that the former results in a net expense requiring
increased funding; the latter, though raising contribution requirements in the short term, will
lower them in future years by requiring repayments that will be counted as United Nations
income. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 62-74 and accompanying text (discussion of apportionment process);
Report of the Committee on Contributions, supra note 3 (scale of assessments).
33. The industrialized nations as a group bear the largest share of United Nations
expenses. See Report of the Committee on Contributions, supra note 3, annex IV (official
1983] UNITED NATIONS FINANCING
industrialized nations saw a link between the new funding scheme
and the criteria governing membership on the Commission, 34 ap-
parently taking the view that their financial contributions should
entitle them to participate in the Commission's decision-making
process. They accordingly pressed for signature to the Final Act of
the Conference as appropriate qualification for membership.3 5 Be-
fore the eleventh and final negotiating session convened, however,
both the broad membership provision and the loan scheme were
dropped from the draft resolution .3
The United States returned to the negotiations at the eleventh
session, 37 but when efforts to meet the American objections to the
draft Convention failed, 38 President Reagan announced that the
United States would not sign the Convention. 39 The resolution
establishing the Preparatory Commission, adopted by the Confer-
ence at the end of the eleventh session, provided that membership
on the Commission would be open only to Convention signatories, 40
and that the Commission would be financed from the regular
budget of the United Nations. 41 Subsequently, the General Assem-
bly formally approved this financial arrangement. 42
contribution scale for 1980-82). The five largest contributors accounted for 61.1 % of total
assessments: United States, 25.00%; U.S.S.R. (including Byelorussian S.S.R. and Ukrainian
S.S.R.), 12.95%; Japan, 9.58%; West Germany, 8.31%; France, 6.26%. Id.
34. Working Group of 21 Report, supra note 30, paras. 5, 14.
35. Id. para. 5. See also First Committee, supra note 20, at 6-7 (statement of delegate of
the United Kingdom). Signature to the Final Act of the Conference did not constitute
approval of the Convention.
36. Draft Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the International
Sea-Bed Authority and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, paras. 2, 11, U.N.
Doe. A/Conf.62/WG.21/Informal Paper 17 (1981).
37. Statement of President Ronald Reagan (Jan. 29, 1982), reprinted in DEP'T ST.
BULL., Mar. 1982, at 54. See also Report of the Chairman of the First Committee, supra note
27, paras. 25-27.
38. 17 UNCLOS III OR (174th plen. mtg.) at 13, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.62/SR.174 (prov.'
ed. 1982). See Report of the Chairman of the First Committee, supra note 27, paras. 32-34
(description of Conference reaction to United States objections).
39. Statement of President Ronald Reagan (July 9, 1982), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL.,
Aug. 1982, at 71.
40. Conference Resolution I, supra note 12, para. 2.
41. Id. para. 14.
42. G.A. Res. 37/66, para. 9, U.N. Doc. A/Res/37/66 (1982). It is noteworthy that if this
resolution had failed, the Preparatory Commission would have been left entirely without
funds because no alternative source of financing was provided in the Conference Resolution.
See Conference Resolution I, supra note 12. Passage of the resolution was never in doubt,
however, because an overwhelming number of United Nations members had already voted
for the Convention, see G.A. Res. 37/66, supra, preambular para. 2, and the 21 members
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II. UNITED NATIONS FINANCING UNDER ARTICLE 17
The budgetary and revenue raising authority of the United
Nations43 is vested in the General Assembly by article 17 of the
United Nations Charter. 44 Except for two articles in the Statute of
the International Court of Justice which pertain solely to that
organ, 45 article 17 is the only Charter provision which refers to
budgetary authority or the power to apportion expenses or other-
wise raise revenue. 46 The first two paragraphs of article 17 provide:
1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the
budget of the Organization.
2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the
Members as apportioned by the General Assembly. 47
Paragraph 1 gives the Assembly control over the budget proc-
ess as well as authority to make the policy decisions that determine
the level of funding for each United Nations program. 48 The budget
process is governed by financial regulations adopted by the General
Assembly. 49 Briefly, the regulations call for the Secretary-General
voting against or abstaining accounted for more than 60% of contributions to the United
Nations regular budget. See Statement of President Ronald Reagan, supra note 39. Thus, the
United Nations financing scheme provided an opportunity for states favoring the Convention
to vote themselves a substantial cost reduction at the expense of opposing and abstaining
members.
43. For detailed studies of United Nations financing, see generally CARNEGIE ENDOW-
MENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1947); J. D. SINGER,
FINANCING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: THE UNITED NATIONS BUDGET PROCESS (1961); J.
STOESSINGER, FINANCING THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM (1964).
44. J. STOESSINGER, supra note 43, at 79-80.
45. I.C.J. STAT. arts. 33, 35 para. 3. The International Court of Justice is a principal
organ of the United Nations. U.N. CHARTER art. 7, para. 1.
46. See J. STOESSINGER, supra note 43, at 79-80.
47. U.N. CHARTER art. 17.
48. See CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, supra note 43, at 12-14; J. D.
SINGER, supra note 43, at 8.
49. The financial regulations of the United Nations were adopted by resolution of the
General Assembly in 1950. G.A. Res. 456, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/
1775 (1950). The regulations have been often amended. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3371 B, 30 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 124, U.N. Doc. A/10,034 (1975) (to require contributions from
nonmember states participating in activities financed by the United Nations); G.A. Res. 973
B, 10 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 36, U.N. Doc. A/3116 (1955) (to account for initiation of
the Staff Assessment Plan and the Tax Equalization Fund). The regulations authorized the
Secretary-General to establish detailed financial rules and procedures. Financial Regulations
of the United Nations, Annex to G.A. Res. 456, reg. 10.1(a), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at
59, 61, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). The regulations, along with the rules established there-
under, appear in U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/Financial Rules/1/Rev.2/Amend.2 (1980), reprinted in
UNITED NATIONS FINANCE MANUAL § 1.00 (1981) [hereinafter cited as U.N. FINANCE MAN-
UAL]. For a thorough analysis of the United Nations' budget process, see J. D. SINGER, supra
note 43.
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to present estimates50 for the following biennium 5' to an expert
advisory committee appointed by the General Assembly.52 The Sec-
retary-General's estimates and the report of the advisory committee
are then referred to the Administrative and Budgetary Commit-
tee, 53 which forwards a recommended budget to the General As-
sembly.5 4 Approval of the budget requires a two-thirds majority in
the Assembly. 55 The General Assembly enjoys broad discretion in
determining the amount to be appropriated for each program.56
Paragraph 2 contains three clauses which pertain to the Gen-
eral Assembly's authority to raise revenue. The purpose of this
50. Financial regs. 3.1, 3.2, and accompanying rules, U.N. FINANCE MANUAL, supra
note 49, at 2-3. See J. STOESSINGER, supra note 43, at 91.
51. The United Nations operated on an annual budget until 1973; a biennial budget
cycle was introduced for the years 1974-1975. G.A. Res. 3043, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30)
at 102, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
52. Financial reg. 3.5, U.N. FINANCE MANUAL, supra note 49, at 3. The Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) is appointed by the Gen-
eral Assembly to examine and report on the Secretary-General's budget estimates, J. STOES-
SINGER, supra note 43, at 92; to advise the Fifth Committee and the Assembly on any
budgetary or administrative matters referred to it, id.; to examine for the Assembly the
administrative budgets of the specialized agencies, id.; and to examine and report to the
General Assembly on the auditor's reports concerning the accounts of the United Nations as
well as on those of the specialized agencies. Id. See Rules of Procedure of the General
Assembly, rules 155-157, U.N. Doc. A/520/Rev.14, at 34-35 (1981) [hereinafter cited as G.A.
Rules of Procedure].
The Secretary-General is required to submit his estimates to the ACABQ 12 weeks before
the opening of the regular session of the General Assembly. Financial reg. 3.5, supra. Regular
sessions of the General Assembly are convened annually on the third Tuesday in September.
G.A. Rules of Procedure, supra, rule 1. This means that the estimates are forwarded to the
ACABQ approximately in mid-June of each year.
53. See Financial reg. 3.5, U.N. FINANCE MANUAL, supra note 49, at 3. The Adminis-
trative and Budgetary Committee (the Fifth Committee) is one of the main committees of the
General Assembly. G.A. Rules of Procedure, supra note 52, rule 98. Each member of the
United Nations has one representative on the Fifth Committee. Id. rule 100. The Fifth
Committee considers and reports on matters referred to it by the General Assembly relating
to administrative and budgetary questions. Id. rule 97. It is noteworthy that decisions of the
Fifth Committee are made by majority vote, id. rule 125, while budgetary decisions of the
General Assembly require a two-thirds majority. U.N. CHARTER art. 18, para. 2. For a
general discussion of the Fifth Committee's budgetary functions, see J. D. SINGER, supra note
43, at 96-119.
54. Financial reg. 3.7, U.N. FINANCE MANUAL, supra note 49, at 4.
55. U.N. CHARTER art. 18, para. 2. Consideration of the budget by the General Assem-
bly is not purely formal, although the budget is rarely scrutinized in detail before that body.
J. STOESSINCER, supra note 43, at 93. A typical budget resolution appears at G.A. Res. 34/230
A, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 232, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979) (for 1980-81 biennium).
56. See J. D. SINGER, supra note 43, at 30.
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paragraph is to provide a means of funding the "expenses of the
Organization. '5 7 A statement of the obligation of all members to
contribute is contained in the phrase "shall be borne by the Mem-
bers."' 58 Authority to determine the amount each nation is obliged
to pay is vested solely in the General Assembly by the words "as
apportioned by the General Assembly." 59 Stated differently, para-
graph 2 provides that members of the United Nations are obligated
to contribute to the expenses of the Organization in the amounts
assessed by the General Assembly. The United States now questions
the applicability of this paragraph to the Preparatory Commission
financing plan. 0
To determine the effect of the American refusal to pay assessed
amounts for the Preparatory Commission, the apportionment proc-
ess will be briefly described. The financial regulations adopted by
the General Assembly govern the apportionment procedure as well
as the budget process."' To calculate the amount to be apportioned
to member states, the total projected expenditure for each year6 2 is
reduced by estimates of income from sources other than member
contributions. 3 This procedure has the effect of reducing the total
apportionable amount, which in turn reduces each nation's assess-
ment.6 4 The other sources of United Nations income include net
income from various income producing activities, including the
Visitor's Service, sale of publications, the United Nations book and
57. There is some doubt whether an obligation to contribute accrues with respect to
every "expense of the Organization." See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J.
151, 198 (Advisory Opinion of July 20) (Fitzmaurice, J., separate opinion).
58. The phrase "shall be borne" was drafted for the express purpose of providing a clear
statement of obligation. Doc. 1094, 11/1/40, 8 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 487 (1945). See also Certain
Expenses, 1962 I.C.J. at 210 (Fitzmaurice, J., separate opinion) (language adopted with a
view to embodying a clear statement of financial obligation).
59. The "apportionment" power is the power to determine the amount that each nation
must contribute to defray the expenses of the Organization. The practice at the United
Nations has been apportionment on the basis of capacity to pay. G.A. Res. 36/231 A, 36 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 221, U.N. Doe. A/36/51 (1981).
60. See Fact Sheet, supra note 6, at 1.
61. Financial regs. 5.1-5.10 and rules established thereunder, U.N. FINANCE MANUAL,
supra note 49, at 8-14.
62. Although the budget period is two years, see supra note 51, apportionment occurs
on an annual basis. Financial reg. 5.2, U.N. FINANCE MANUAL, supra note 49, at 9. To
determine the projected expenditure for each year, the total appropriation for the budget
period is simply divided by two. Id.
63. Financial reg. 5.2(b)-(e), U.N. FINANCE MANUAL, supra note 49, at 9.
64. J. STOESSINGER, supra note 43, at 90.
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gift shops, and the United Nations garage service, 65 as well as
unspent appropriations from the previous budget periods66 and
contributions from nonmembers that participate in United Nations
activities.6 7 A set-off is also made against each member's assessment
for credits it may have as a result of staff assessments. 8
The amount each nation must pay is calculated by the Com-
mittee on Contributions, 9 following guidelines approved by the
General Assembly. 70 A percentage of the total to be apportioned is
assigned to each member on the basis of capacity to pay.71 The
United States typically shoulders 25 % of the total, 72 while several of
the smallest and least developed nations are assessed the minimum
0.01% .73 The Charter provides that any member more than two
years in arrears on these assessments. loses its vote in the General
Assembly.74
Because members are not assessed separately for each budget
item, refusal to contribute to a particular activity does not result in
a direct loss of funds for that activity. For example, in the present
controversy the United States will "withhold" payments for the
Preparatory Commission simply by subtracting its share of the
Commission's cost from its annual general payment; 75 the United
States cannot "earmark" its arrears to the Preparatory Commis-
sion's budget line. Still, the requirement that all other sources of
income be exhausted before any apportionment occurs76 means that
any withheld payment will result in a loss of funds that can be
replaced only by voluntary contributions. 77
65. Financial rule 107.3, U.N. FINANCE MANUAL, supra note 49, at 17.
66. Financial rule 107.2(a), U.N. FINANCE MANUAL, supra note 49, at 17.
67. Financial reg. 5.9, U.N. FINANCE MANUAL, supra note 49, at 13.
68. Financial rule 105.5, U.N. FINANCE MANUAL, supra note 49, at 10.
69. The Committee on Contributions is an expert committee appointed by the General
Assembly to give advice on the scale of assessments and arrearages. G.A. Rules of Procedure,
supra note 52, rules 158-160.
70. The guidelines are set forth in G.A. Res. 36/231 A, 36 U.N. CAOR Supp. (No. 51) at
221, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981).
71. G.A. Rules of Procedure, supra note 52, rule 160. Particular factors for consider-
ation include: dependence of the member's earnings on one or a few products, inability to
secure foreign currency, and the "concept of accumulated national wealth." G.A. Res. 36/
231 A, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 221, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981).
72. See materials cited supra note 3.
73. Id.
74. U.N. CHARTER art. 19.
75. See Fact Sheet, supra note 6, at 2.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
77. A voluntary contribution accepted by the United Nations for purposes specified by
the donor may be credited to a special account for such purposes. Financial reg. 7.3, U.N.
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III. INTERPRETING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S POWERS
UNDER ARTICLE 17: THE CERTAIN EXPENSES OPINION
By basing its refusal to contribute to the costs of the Prepara-
tory Commission on legal grounds, the United States puts in issue
the authority of the General Assembly under article 17. The Inter-
national Court of Justice considered a similar challenge in a 1962
advisory opinion. 78 There the Court outlined the relevant factors
for determining the meaning of article 17, paragraph 2.
A. The Advisory Opinion
In 1961, the United Nations was brought close to bankruptcy 79
when many members failed to pay assessments for costly peace-
keeping operations ° performed by United Nations subsidiary or-
gans8"' in Egypt (UNEF)82 and the Congo (ONUC). 83 Although a
portion of the arrearage was attributable to the inability of some
FINANCE MANUAL, supra note 49, at 18. Voluntary contributions received by the United
Nations for unspecified purposes are taken into account as miscellaneous income. Financial
reg. 7.4, U.N. FINANCE MANUAL, supra note 49, at 18. The former type of gift results in
added income for the United Nations; the latter simply reduces each nation's assessment.
78. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (Advisory Opinion of July
20); see J. STOESSINCER, supra note 43, at 121-22.
79. Id. at 121.
80. The only major peacekeeping operation before 1961 was the action in Korea be-
tween 1950 and 1953. This operation had been financed through voluntary contributions. Id.
at 101-04. The peacekeeping operations at issue before the International Court of Justice
were the first substantial programs in which an effort was made to cover a major portion of
the expense by apportionment. Id. at 19.
81. See infra notes 146-53 for the distinctions between subsidiary organs and other
bodies.
82. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was created by act of the General
Assembly, G.A. Res. 1000 (ES-I), ES-I U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/3354
(1956), to restore peace after a French-British-Israeli action in the Suez area. J. STOESSINEB,
supra note 43, at 107. It was decided that the first U.S.$10 million of the cost of this force
would be apportioned among the members of the United Nations according to the scale
adopted for contributions to the regular budget. G.A. Res. 1089, para. 1, 11 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 17) at 46, U.N. Doc. A/3572 (1956). For various reasons, over one third of the
member states regularly defaulted on their assessments. J. STOESSINCER, supra note 43, at 110.
By 1960, arrears totalled nearly 25% of the UNEF budget. Id. at 121.
83. The United Nations Congo Force (ONUC) was established by the Security Council
and placed under the direction of the Secretary-General. 15 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept.
1960) at 16, U.N. Doc. S/4387 (1960). Intervention was necessary when the security forces of
the newly-independent Congo found they were unable to maintain order. J. STOESSINGE1,
supra note 43, at 113. Once again, the General Assembly decided to apportion the bulk of the
expense. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1732, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 55, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1961) (apportioning U.S.$80 million for ONUC expenses for the period Nov. 1, 1961 to June
30, 1962). As in the case of UNEF, see supra note 82, substantial arrearages caused a shortfall
of almost 40% in the ONUC budget for 1960. J. STOESSINCe, supra note 43, at 121.
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members to meet the large expense,84 several nations challenged the
legal basis of the assessment.85 The General Assembly decided to
seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice 88
on the question whether the expenditures authorized by the Gen-
eral Assembly for UNEF and ONUC constituted "expenses of the
Organization" within the meaning of article 17, paragraph 2, of the
Charter. 87 The Court answered in the affirmative,88 but the United
84. J. STOESSINGER, supra note 43, at 110, 122. UNEF expenses averaged U.S.$20
million per year from 1957 to 1963. See id. at 109. ONUC expenses totalled U.S.$66.6 million
in 1960, id. at 114, and were estimated at U.S.$135 million for 1961. Id. at 116. If the entire
amount had been assessed to the poorest nations at the then minimum 0.04% share, they
would have been obliged to pay over U.S.$136,000 each over the seven year period. The
actual assessments were much smaller, due to large voluntary contributions by the United
Kingdom (UNEF) and the United States (UNEF and ONUC). Id. at 109, 120.
85. Id. at 110, 121-22. Some Latin American nations argued that peacekeeping opera-
tions should be viewed as extraordinary expenses not apportionable under article 17. Id.
France and the Soviet Union took the position that the Assembly lacked authority to create
binding financial obligations in matters affecting peace and security. Id. at 121. In the Soviet
view, apportionment of such expenses was the sole province of the Security Council. Id. at
117.
86. G.A. Res. 1731, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 54, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961);
Certain Expenses, 1962 I.C.J. at 152-53. The Charter authorizes the General Assembly to
request an advisory opinion on any legal question. U.N. CHARTER art. 96, para. 1. The Court
is not required to render an opinion. I.C.J. STAT. art. 65, para. 1.
87. See supra text accompanying note 47 for the full text of article 17, paragraph 2.
88. Certain Expenses, 1962 I.C.J. at 179-80. The Court was divided by nine votes to
five, id., and only five judges could join the opinion of the Court without some reservation
(Alfaro, Badawi, Wellington Koo, Tanaka and Jessup, JJ.). See id. at 151, 180-81. Judge
Spiropoulos stated in a separate declaration that the Court's discussion of whether the
resolutions relating to UNEF and ONUC conformed to the Charter was unnecessary and
unauthorized. See id. at 180-81 (Spiropoulos, J., declaration). Judge Sir Percy Spender
agreed with Judge Spiropoulos and went on to criticize the Court's use of subsequent United
Nations practice in interpreting Charter provisions. Id. at 182-97 (Spender, J., separate
opinion). Judge Morelli presented an analysis which linked "expenses" to the "budget"
provision of article 17, paragraph 1. Id. at 216-26 (Morelli, J., separate opinion). A third
separate opinion, of great interest in the present discussion, was filed by Judge Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice. Id. at 198-215 (Fitzmaurice, J., separate opinion). Sir Gerald thought the Court
had not provided sufficient guidance because it had not treated the question of obligation to
pay as distinct from the scope of "expenses of the Organization." Id. at 198. He then
indicated general limitations on the Assembly's power over expenditures and apportionment.
Id. at 206-15. Of the five dissenting judges, two thought the Court was unable to render an
opinion for procedural reasons, id. at 235-38 (Basdevant, J., dissenting); id. at 239-52
(Moreno Quintana, J., dissenting), and three dissented on the merits. Id. at 227 (Winiarski,
C.J., dissenting), 253 (Koretsky, J., dissenting), 288 (Bustamante, J., dissenting).
The opinion is analyzed in Gross, Expenses of the United Nations jor Peace-Keeping
Operations: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, 17 INT'L OaG. 1
(1962); Hogg, Peace-Keeping Costs and Charter Obligations- Implications of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice Decision on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 62 COLUM. L.
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States nevertheless relies upon the opinion to support its current
anti-apportionment position.8 9
The Court began its analysis by interpreting the question be-
fore it narrowly, noting that it had not been called upon to deter-
mine issues involving the apportionment power or the obligation of
members to pay.90 Having limited the issue to the interpretation of
"expenses of the Organization," the Court stated that it had not
been asked "to give an abstract definition of the words 'expenses of
the Organization'. It ha[d] been asked to answer a specific question
related to certain identified expenditures which have actually been
made ... ."' The Court then addressed three arguments which
purported to find a basis in the Charter for interpreting "expenses"
in a way that would exclude amounts disbursed to cover the costs of
UNEF and ONUC.9 2
The first of these arguments was that both "budget" in para-
graph 1 and "expenses" in paragraph 2 of article 17 should be read
as impliedly qualified by the word "regular" or "administrative. ' ' 93
Under this view, expenses which were described as "operational,"
including those for UNEF and ONUC, would lie entirely outside
the ambit of article 17, and apportionment would not be autho-
REv. 1230 (1962); Jackson, The Legal Framework of United Nations Financing: Peacekeep-
ing and Penury, 51 CAL. L. REV. 79 (1963).
The pleadings, oral arguments and other documents relating to the opinion are pub-
lished in a separate volume. 1962 I.C.J. Pleadings (Certain Expenses).
The opinion was accepted by the General Assembly. G.A. Res. 1854, 17 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 17) at 54-55, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). This action was viewed as giving legal
force to the opinion. Statement of Abram Chayes before the World Peace Through Law
Conference (July 3, 1963), reprinted in 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 912, 915 (1963). Nevertheless,
payment was not forthcoming from many of the nations which had refused to pay. Id. at 917-
18. The United States urged application of the article 19 sanction: loss of vote in the General
Assembly for nations more than two years in arrears. Id. Article 19 was not applied, see
Statement of Ambassador Arthur Goldberg Before the United Nations Special Committee on
Peacekeeping Operations, U.N. Doc. A/AC.121/SR.15 (1965), reprinted in 60 AM. J. INT'L
L. 104, 105 (1965), and the United States announced that it would reserve "the same option
to make exceptions [to the principle of collective financial responsibility] if . . . strong and
compelling reasons exist for doing so." Id. at 106.
For an appraisal of the continued vitality of the article 19 sanction, see Rosenstock,
Article 19: The Caribbean Contribution-A Note, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 919 (1970).
89. See Statement of President Ronald W. Reagan, supra note 5; Fact Sheet, supra note
6. See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1982, at 1, col. 5 (both United States and United Nations cite
opinion to support their opposed positions).
90. 1962 I.C.J. at 157-58.
91. Id. at 158
92. Id. at 159-70.
93. Id. at 159-61.
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rized.9 4 The Court analyzed the intent of the drafters of the Charter
and found no justification for distinguishing between "administra-
tive" and "operational" budgets. It similarly concluded that
"'expenses of the Organization' means all the expenses and not just
certain types of expenses which might be referred to as 'regular
expenses'."96
Next, the Court considered an argument that operations for
the maintenance of international peace and security are not "ex-
penses of the Organization" within the meaning of article 17 be-
cause such expenses should be independently financed through
agreements formed by the Security Council under article 43.17 The
Court looked at the place of article 17 in the general structure and
scheme of the Charter, and stated:
The general purposes of Article 17 are the vesting of control over
the finances of the Organization, and the levying of apportioned
amounts of the expenses of the Organization in order to enable it
to carry out the functions of the Organization as a whole acting
through its principal organs and such subsidiary organs as may
be established under the authority of Article 22 or Article 29.98
UNEF and ONUC had the appropriate nexus with the United
Nations, because both were subsidiary organs. 9  The Court con-
cluded that expenditures for peace and security that are not other-
wise financed fall within the General Assembly's apportioning
94. Id.
95. See id. at 161. The passage under discussion construes article 17, paragraph 1,
which is set forth supra at text accompanying note 47.
96. 1962 I.C.J. at 161.
97. Id. at 162-67. The Soviet Union had argued that article 43, paragraph 2 (authoriz-
ing the Security Council to enter into agreements with member states governing "the nature
of facilities and assistance to be provided"), carved out an exception to article 17, paragraph
2, and that it was for the Security Council to apportion such expenses. Statement of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1962 I.C.J. Pleadings (Certain Expenses) 404 (Statement deliv-
ered May 21, 1962); see 1962 I.C.J. at 166 (Court's discussion of the argument). The Court
found first that UNEF and ONUC did not constitute article 43 enforcement actions. 1962
I.C.J. at 166. Then it stated that even if article 43 were applicable, any expenses incurred
pursuant to article 43 agreements would constitute "expenses of the Organization" to the
extent the agreements failed to provide for them. Id.
98. 1962 I.C.J. at 162.
99. UNEF was a subsidiary organ established by the General Assembly under article 22
of the United Nations Charter. See supra note 82. ONUC was a subsidiary organ established
by the Security Council under article 29. See supra note 83.
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power, 00 and that the costs of actions which the Security Council is
authorized to take constitute "expenses of the Organization."1 0'
The third argument addressed by the Court was that the acti-
vities of UNEF and ONUC were ultra vires the United Nations
because they had not been initiated and carried out in conformity
with the division of functions prescribed in the Charter. 02 The
Court applied a negative functional test: 10 3 "[I]f an expenditure
were made for a purpose which is not one of the purposes of the
United Nations, it could not be considered an 'expense of the Orga-
nization'." 0 4 The Court explained that the costs of actions within
the scope of the United Nations' power may be considered "expenses
of the Organization" even if carried out by the wrong organ. 105 This
conclusion was based on a maxim of the law of agency that a
principal is bound by the ultra vires act of his agent if the act is
within the scope of the agent's authority.106
100. 1962 I.C.J. at 164.
101. Id. at 167.
102. Id. at 167-70. See Written Statement of Czechoslovakia, 1962 I.C.J. Pleadings
(Certain Expenses) 178 (Statement dated Feb. 20, 1962) (asserting that the General Assembly
acted ultra vires in approving UNEF and ONUC financing); Written Statement of South
Africa, id. at 263 (declaring that the approved activities were ultra vires); Memorandum of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Government, id. at 272 (stating that the appropriating
resolution was "illegitimate" and not binding).
The rights and obligations of members of an international organization which acts ultra
vires are not clearly defined. For example, there is disagreement about whether an ultra vires
act is void ab initio, or merely voidable upon a finding of ultra vires by the organization itself
or a competent tribunal. Oseike, The Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions of International
Organizations, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 239 (1983). In addition, "substantive" and "procedural"
ultra vires acts may be treated differently. Id. at 243-47. For a detailed discussion of several
thorny aspects of the ultra vires problem, see id.
103. See Gross, supra note 88, at 4.
104. 1962 I.C.J. at 167.
105. Id. at 168. The Court observed that the financial regulations state that appropria-
tions voted by the General Assembly constitute an authorization to the Secretary-General to
incur obligations on behalf of the Organization. Id. at 168-69. See reg. 4.1, U.N. FINANCE
MANUAL, supra note 49, at 7. The Court stated that the Organization has no alternative but
to honor such obligations, which therefore constitute "expenses of the Organization." 1962
I.C.J. at 168-70.
106. 1962 I.C.J. at 168. Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice offered a telling criticism of this
line of reasoning. Id. at 199-200. He stated that the Court's analysis
is certainly correct in one sense, namely, that internal irregularities would not affect
liabilities definitely incurred by or on behalf of the Organization, in relation to third
parties outside the Organization or its membership. But what is really in question
here is the relationship of the Member States inter se, and vis-h-vis the Organization
as such. ...
Id. (footnote omitted).
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To summarize, the Court applied two separate tests in deter-
mining that UNEF and ONUC expenditures constituted "expenses
of the Organization." First, the expenditures were within the pur-
poses of article 17 because they arose from the activities of principal
and subsidiary organs, 0 7 bodies which have the closest nexus with
the United Nations. 108 Second, they were not ultra vires because the
"purposes of the Organization" include maintenance of peace and
security. 09 The Court did not purport to render a definition of
"expenses of the Organization" that would apply in every situa-
tion,1 0 but it did indicate that both the purpose of the activity and
the nexus"' between the United Nations and the body performing
the activity are to be considered.
B. Applicability of the Opinion to the Preparatory
Commission Dispute
Although the Certain Expenses opinion contains useful obser-
vations about article 17 and its interpretation, there is no explicit
treatment of perhaps the most fundamental point in interpreting
the phrase "expenses of the Organization": This language is to be
construed as a limitation on both the General Assembly's apportion-
ing power and the obligation of members to pay assessments."
2
Thus, an obligation to contribute to the expenses of the Preparatory
Commission arises only if such expenditures constitute "expenses of
the Organization" within the meaning of article 17. " 3 It is also
noteworthy that paragraph 1 contains no provision to the effect
107. Id. at 162. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
109. 1962 I.C.J. at 167-68. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
110. 1962 I.C.J. at 157-58. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
112. It appears that this proposition was so universally recognized that there was no
need to state it. An understanding that the Assembly may not apportion amounts other than
"expenses" is implicit in the phrasing of the question presented to the Court by the General
Assembly. The Assembly stated that it sought guidance as to obligations of member states,
but framed the question: "Do the expenditures ... constitute 'expenses of the Organization'
within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2 ... ?" G.A. Res. 1731, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 17) at 54, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961). The implication is that the obligation to contribute
depends on whether the amount in question constitutes an "expense."
Even nations favoring apportionment of UNEF and ONUC expenses recognized that
only "expenses" could be apportioned. See, e.g., Written Statement of the Kingdom of
Denmark, 1962 I.C.J. Pleadings (Certain Expenses) 138 (Statement dated Feb. 20, 1962).
113. But see infra note 120 and accompanying text (not all "expenses" give rise to
obligations to pay).
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that only "expenses of the Organization" may comprise the "budget
of the Organization." The General Assembly's budgetary authority
may thus be broader than its apportioning authority. In some cases,
therefore, the Assembly may not be authorized to apportion an
expenditure that is within its power to approve. 114
Proponents of Preparatory Commission funding from the regu-
lar United Nations budget contend that the Certain Expenses opin-
ion supports their position,1 5 citing broad language defining "ex-
penses" as "amounts paid out to defray the costs of carrying out
[United Nations] purposes." "6 It is argued that because the Prepar-
atory Commission helps "achieve international co-operation in solv-
ing international problems of an economic .. .character,,"1 1 7 ex-
penditures to finance the Commission are expenditures for United
Nations purposes, and are therefore "expenses of the Organization."
The argument is based on the assumption that once an expenditure
is classified as an "expense," the General Assembly is authorized to
apportion it and members are obligated to pay their assessed
shares." 8
In evaluating this position, it must first be observed that the
Court carefully parsed the question presented to it by the General
Assembly and flatly declared that only the construction of the
phrase "expenses of the Organization," and not questions involving
the financial obligations of members, was before the Court." 9 In
fact, one of the concurring judges outlined two categories of "ex-
penses" that may not give rise to financial obligations.1l 0 Second,
114. See, e.g., infra notes 195-206 and accompanying text.
115. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1982, at 1, col. 5.
116. Id. See 1962 I.C.J. at 158.-
117. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3. See also id. art. 13, para. l(b) (functions of the
General Assembly).
118. Sir Gerald attacked this presumption, 1962 I.C.J. at 207, which was evidently
embraced by the Court. See id. at 164.
119. Id. at 157-58. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. But see 1962 I.C.J. at
164 (discussing apportionment and obligation to pay).
120. 1962 I.C.J. at 212-14 (Fitzmaurice, J., separate opinion). The two classes of cases
are those in which the "action" to be taken under a resolution consists solely of provision for
making a payment, see infra notes 201-06 and accompanying text, and those in which the
activity to be financed is permissive (mostly social and economic activities) rather than
obligatory. 1962 I.C.J. at 213.
The expenditure for the Preparatory Commission fits under both categories. The resolu-
tion authorizing the financing of the Preparatory Commission from the United Nations
budget contains nine other operative paragraphs. See G.A. Res. 37/66, U.N. Doe. A/Res/37/
66 (1982). Five of these do not authorize any United Nations action. Id. paras. 1-4, 6. The
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the broad language relied upon to support Preparatory Commission
funding from the regular budget of the United Nations 2' appears in
a passage where the Court spoke hypothetically about a possible
starting point for its analysis. 12 2 Furthermore, so broad a definition
of "expenses of the Organization" was not necessary to render an
opinion on the General Assembly's question as construed by the
Court. 23
Nonetheless, two passages in the Court's opinion may indicate
that a broad reading of "expenses" is appropriate. The first appears
as the Court considered whether the budget and the expenses of the
organization should include operational expenditures or should be
limited to administrative expenditures. 124 There, the Court stated
that the term 'expenses of the Organization' means all the expenses
and is not limited to certain types. 2 5 This language, however, does
not support the position that funding of the Preparatory Commis-
sion is permitted under the Charter. Expenditures for the Prepara-
tory Commission are neither administrative nor operational ex-
penses of the United Nations. 126 They are subsidies127 used to
others require the Secretary-General: to enter into an agreement with Jamaica for hosting the
Final Act ceremonies (an activity of the Conference as opposed to the Commission), id. para.
5; to assume responsibilities assigned to him by the Convention, id. para. 7; to convene the
Preparatory Commission and provide services, id. para. 8; and to submit a report to the
General Assembly. Id. para. 10. These provisions are sufficiently separate from the financing
provision of paragraph 9 to permit the conclusion that the subsidy was an end in itself rather
than a means to effectuate the rest of the resolution. Thus, the "sole object" analysis comes
into play.
The Preparatory Commission is manifestly part of a "social or economic" undertaking in
which the United Nations is not obliged by its Charter to participate.
121. See supra text accompanying note 116.
122. The quoted passage, placed in context, reads:
It would be possible to begin with a general proposition to the effect that the
"expenses" of any organization are the amounts paid out to defray the costs of
carrying out its purposes . . . [o]r, it might simply be said that the "expenses" of an
organization are those which are provided for in its budget.
1962 I.C.J. at 158.
123. Id. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
124. 1962 I.C.J. at 159-62. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
125. 1962 I.C.J. at 161.
126. The administrative costs and the operational costs of the United Nations are not
defrayed by payment to an outside organization. See infra notes 141-67 and accompanying
text.
127. The term "subsidy" as used herein means a transfer of United Nations funds to
another agency to finance the agency's activities under the agency's direction. Provision of
services, see U.N. CHARTER art. 66, para. 2, on a reimbursable or reciprocal basis, see
Financial rule 114.2, U.N. FINANCE MANUAL, supra note 49, at 53-54, does not constitute a
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finance the operation and administration of the Preparatory Com-
mission, an entity separate from the United Nations. 28 Subsidies
are wholly outside the scope of the Court's discussion.12 Indeed,
Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, who attempted in his separate opin-
ion 30 to define "expenses of the Organization" more precisely than
had the Court,13' stated that such expenses would include "expendi-
tures arising in the course, or out of the performance by the Organi-
zation of its functions under the Charter."'' 1 2
The second passage which might be read as a broad construc-
tion of "expenses of the Organization" is the test applied to deter-
mine whether expenditures are ultra vires: an expenditure made for
a purpose which is not one of the purposes of the United Nations is
not an "expense of the Organization."133 This test, however, offers
a standard only for excluding expenditures from the category "ex-
penses." There is no basis for the inference that every expenditure in
furtherance of a purpose of the United Nations is an "expense"
within the meaning of article 17. The test suggests only that an
expenditure for a United Nations purpose is not ultra vires. 34
Those who contend that the Certain Expenses opinion con-
firms the obligation of United Nations members to finance the
Preparatory Commission not only invert the "purposes of the
United Nations" test, but ignore altogether the "nexus" test. 35 The
"subsidy" in this sense, because the premises and personnel involved are still under direct
United Nations control.
128. See infra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
129. See 1962 I.C.J. at 159-62. Subsidies granted by the United Nations may have been
unknown in 1962. Two years after the Certain Expenses opinion was rendered, a commenta-
tor stated that the specialized agencies are financed in all cases by assessments of their own
members, with additional funds coming from the Expanded Programme of Technical Assist-
ance (EPTA) and voluntary contributions. J. STOESSINCER, supra note 43, at 216. (EPTA was
a United Nations program financed by voluntary contributions. Id. at 202.) The history of
major economic and social programs at the United Nations shows they were built on volun-
tary contributions. Id. at 19.
130. 1962 I.C.J. at 198-215.
131. Id. at 206-07.
132. Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 167. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
134. This is not a legal analysis, but a grammatical one; there is no double negative. See
1962 I.C.J. at 162. If the holding had been that every expenditure for a United Nations
purpose constituted an expense of the Organization, discussion of the purposes of article 17
would have been superfluous. It was in this context that the "nexus" text was applicable. See
id.
135. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
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Court found that the purpose of article 17 (presumably paragraphs
1 and 2) is to enable the Organization to finance the activities of its
principal and subsidiary organs. 136 Proponents of the Preparatory
Commission funding scheme overlook the requirement of a nexus
between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission.
Although the Court did not unnecessarily extend the reach of
article 17, neither did it use any limiting language that would
evince an intention to restrict the application of article 17 to ex-
penses of United Nations organs.137 The United States relies on such
a restrictive reading to support its position that only organizations
which are "answerable" to the United Nations can incur expenses
apportionable to United Nations members. 38 The Court set out to
determine whether UNEF and ONUC expenditures constituted "ex-
penses of the Organization"; 139 the ruling did not encompass agen-
cies other than United Nations organs.
The advisory opinion is instructive in that it outlines a frame-
work for determining the meaning of "expenses of the Organiza-
tion." Expenditures which are not made for Charter purposes are
ultra vires the Organization and therefore not valid "expenses."14 0
Other expenditures constitute "expenses," at least with respect to
activities of the principal and subsidiary organs.14 ' However, the
Opinion is neither broad enough t6 sustain the apportionment of
Preparatory Commission expenditures142 nor narrow enough to sup-
port the United States opposition.143 Thus, determination of the
Preparatory Commission dispute requires analysis of the General
Assembly's budgetary and apportionment authority with respect to
bodies other than United Nations organs.144
136. 1962 I.C.J. at 162.
137. The Court consciously narrowed its approach, id. at 158, but in doing so it did not
find that any types of expenditures were not "expenses of the Organization." It simply limited
its consideration to the expenses of the UNEF and ONUC. See id.
138. Statement by President Ronald W. Reagan, supra note 5. See also Fact Sheet,
supra note 6, at 1.
139. See 1962 I.C.J. at 158.
140. Id. at 167; see supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
141. 1962 I.C.J. at 162; see supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 115-36 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
144. The Preparatory Commission is not a United Nations organ. Under the Charter,
organs may be established only by the Charter itself, U.N. CHARTER art. 7, para. 1 (principal
organs); see infra note 147, or by the General Assembly or the Security Council, U.N.
CHARTER arts. 22, 29 (subsidiary organs); see in]ra notes 148-50. The Preparatory Commis-
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IV. EFFECT OF NEXUS ON OBLIGATION TO CONTRIBUTE
The United States contends that "expenses of the Organiza-
tion" are incurred only when the activity funded is under the direct
control of the United Nations. 145 The extent to which an activity is
under United Nations control depends on the formal relationship
between the United Nations and the agency that performs the
activity. The Charter distinguishes three categories of formally rec-
ognized bodies: principal organs, subsidiary organs and specialized
agencies. 146 The principal organs of the United Nations are estab-
lished by article 7.147 The same article authorizes the creation of
subsidiary organs148 by the General Assembly 149 or the Security
Council. 150 Specialized agencies are defined as organizations estab-
lished by intergovernmental agreement, having wide international
responsibilities, 5 1 and brought into relationship with the United
Nations by formal agreement with the Economic and Social Coun-
cil (ECOSOC) .152 Other organizations may have a "consultative"
relationship with ECOSOC, 153 but there is no provision for any
broader formal relationship between the United Nations and these
organizations.
sion was established by a Conference Resolution. Conference Resolution I, supra note 12,
para. 1. See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
145. Statement of President Ronald W. Reagan, supra note 5; see also supra note 6.
146. U.N. CHARTER arts. 7, 57.
147. Article 7, para. I provides:
There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General
Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship
Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.
Id. art. 7, para. 1. The list of principal organs may be modified only by amendment. Id. art.
108.
148. Id. art. 7, para. 2 ("Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be
established in accordance with the present Charter."). Articles 22 and 29 are the only Charter
provisions authorizing establishment of subsidiary organs. Id. arts. 22, 29.
149. Id. art. 22 ("The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it
deems necessary for the performance of its functions."). An article 22 subsidiary organ can
perform only functions that the Assembly is authorized to perform directly. See id. art. 10
(functions of the General Assembly).
150. Id. art. 29 ("The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems
necessary for the performance of its functions."). An article 29 subsidiary organ can only
perform functions that the Security Council is authorized to perform directly. See id. arts. 24,
26 (functions of the Security Council).
151. Id. art. 57.
152. Id. art. 63, para. 1.
153. Id. art. 71.
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Expenditures for activities of principal and subsidiary organs
of the United Nations that are consistent with the Charter consti-
tute "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of article
17154 as construed in Certain Expenses. However, that opinion did
not involve financial arrangements between the United Nations and
specialized agencies or other organizations. Therefore, it must be
determined by other means whether the General Assembly is em-
powered to finance the activities of these bodies 155 and, if so,
whether it is authorized to apportion the expense among mem-
bers.156 To that end it will be useful to describe the present relation-
ship between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission,
as well as changes in that relationship that might occur as a result of
future action.
A. Status of the Preparatory Commission
The Preparatory Commission was established by a Conference
resolution1 7 that was an integral part of the Convention.1 8 Its
mandate is to ensure the timely entry into effective operation of the
International Sea-Bed Authority and the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea,5 9 and to make the necessary arrangements for
the commencement of their functions.e 0 It would seem possible
under these circumstances to view the Commission as either an
extension of the Conference, an extension of the Authority, or an
independent entity.
If the Commission were viewed as an extension of the Confer-
ence, its continued funding would be authorized under the Charter
provisions permitting the Organization to convene conferences.161
154. See supra notes 107, 109 and accompanying text.
155. Expenditure is "a moment logically anterior to apportionment," 1962 I.C.J. at
158, and will be considered as a threshold matter.
156. It does not necessarily follow that every valid expenditure may be validly appor-
tioned. 1962 I.C.J. at 198 (Fitzmaurice, J., separate opinion). Validity is a condition of the
obligation to pay, but it is not necessarily a sufficient condition. Id. at 206. The Court
observed that not all valid expenses are apportioned, since the Organization has sources of
income other than member contributions. Id. at 158; see supra text accompanying notes 65-
68.
157. Conference Resolution I, supra note 12, para. 1.
158. Final Act, supra note 12, para. 42.
159. The Authority and the Tribunal were both established by the Convention. Con-
vention, supra note 4, art. 156 (Authority established); id. annex VI (Statute of the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea).
160. Conference Resolution I, supra note 12, preambular para. 2.
161. U.N. CHARTER arts. 59, 62(4).
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Article 59 authorizes the Organization to "initiate negotiations"; as
the sea law negotiations have already concluded, this provision
cannot serve as a basis for considering the Commission an extension
of the Conference. Article 62 refers more generally to calling inter-
national conferences "on matters falling within [ECOSOC's] com-
petence." In addition, there is some precedent for the "adoption"
by the General Assembly of a Conference it has established, making
it a permanent subsidiary organ under article 22.162 Both of these
approaches fail with respect to the Preparatory Commission be-
cause the Commission has powers the General Assembly does not
have and cannot grant. 16 3 Furthermore, membership on the Com-
mission is limited to signatories of the Convention; 1 4 the General
Assembly has no authority to impose the Convention's terms on its
members.'6 5 For these reasons, it is inappropriate to consider the
Commission an extension of the Conference.
If the Commission were to be viewed as an extension of the
Authority, it might be granted whatever status the Authority would
be entitled to acquire under the Convention. The Convention pro-
vides that the Council (the executive organ of the Authority)
16 6
162. This was the case with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), a pre-existing United Nations Conference which was established as a subsidiary
organ by G.A. Res. 1995, 19 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/5815 (1964).
Membership in UNCTAD is open to all members of the United Nations and all members of
any specialized agency or of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Id. para. 1; cf.
Conference Resolution I, supra note 12, para. 2 (membership on Preparatory Commission).
The functions of UNCTAD, id. para. 3, conform to those of the General Assembly. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 10. The stated functions of UNCTAD are: to promote international trade, G.A.
Res. 1995, supra, para. 3(a); to formulate principles and policies on international trade, id.
para. 3(b); to make proposals for putting those principles and policies into effect, id. para.
3(c); to review and facilitate the coordination of activities of other institutions within the
United Nations system, id. para. 3(d); to initiate action in cooperation with the competent
organs of the United Nations, id. para. 3(e); and to be available as a center for harmonizing
trade and related development policies. Id. para. 3(f). Cf. infra note 163 and materials cited
therein (functions of Preparatory Commission).
163. Conference Resolution I, supra note 12, para. 5(h); Final Act, supra note 12, annex
I, res. II, paras. 3(b) (Preparatory Commission granted power to allocate sea-bed areas to
states making mining applications), 7(c) (Commission determines amount each nation must
spend to develop assigned sea-bed areas), 11 (Commission certifies eligibility of nations to
receive allocated sea-bed areas), 13 (Authority bound by the decisions of the Commission).
Cf. U.N. CHARTER art. 10 (functions of General Assembly); id. art. 22 (Assembly granted
power to create subsidiary organs as necessary "for the performance of its functions").
164. Conference Resolution I, supra note 12, para. 2.
165. The General Assembly can only recommend such terms to its members. U.N.
CHARTER arts. 10-14.
166. Convention, supra note 4, art. 162, para. 1.
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"shall . . . enter into agreements with the United Nations . . .
subject to approval by the [Sea-Bed] Assembly."' 167 This provision
indicates that the Authority is expected to become a specialized
agency. 16 8 The Preparatory Commission, in contrast, has only the
power to "make recommendations concerning the relationship be-
tween the Authority and the United Nations." 69 The Commission
has no power to enter into agreements with the United Nations on
behalf of the Authority. 7 0 Yet, neither the Authority nor the Com-
mission can become a specialized agency without some formal
agreement.' 17 Because the Preparatory Commission is not autho-
rized to enter into the necessary agreements on behalf of the Au-
thority, the Authority cannot acquire specialized agency status until
it is convened. 172 Therefore, the Commission cannot be considered
an extension of the Authority.
The Preparatory Commission is neither an extension of the
Authority nor of the Conference; it is to be considered an indepen-
dent entity. As such, it is currently an outside organization without
special status under the Charter. 7 3 The Commission seems techni-
cally to possess the article 57 qualifications 174 to enter into an
agreement for specialized agency status. 17 However, the Prepara-
tory Commission is not expressly empowered to enter into agree-
ments with the United Nations on its own behalf, 76 and an interna-
tional body with such a short life has never become a specialized
agency. 7 7 Still, the United Nations and the Preparatory Commis-
167. Id. para. 2(f) (emphasis added).
168. Entering into an agreement with the United Nations through ECOSOC is a
prerequisite for specialized agency status. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 57, 63.
169. Conference Resolution I, supra note 12, para. 5(d) (emphasis added).
170. See id.
171. See supra note 168.
172. The Preparatory Commission cannot acquire specialized agency status through the
Authority after the latter convenes because the Commission remains in existence only until
the conclusion of the first session of the Assembly. Conference Resolution I, supra note 12,
para. 13. The Assembly is the sole plenary organ of the Authority. Convention, supra note 4,
art. 160, para. 1.
173. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
174. Specialized agencies are "established by intergovernmental agreement and hav[e]
wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social,
cultural, educational, health, and related fields." U.N. CHARTER art. 57, para. 1.
175. See supra note 168.
176. See Conference Resolution I, supra note 12.
177. Since the initial round of agreements between 1946 and 1951, there have been few
additions to the list of specialized agencies. See generally M. HILL, THE UNITED NATIONS
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sion may find it expedient to establish such a relationship if it will
help give effect to the financing scheme. 178 Therefore, it is necessary
to examine the General Assembly's budgetary and apportioning
authority with respect to both outside organizations 179 and special-
ized agencies. 80
B. Outside Organizations
The General Assembly has authority under article 17, para-
graph 3, to approve financial arrangements with specialized agen-
cies. 181 The Charter makes no reference to the possibility of such
arrangements with other outside organizations. Two inferences
may be drawn. First, the general budgetary authority of the Gen-
eral Assembly'8 2 does not encompass agencies other than United
Nations organs. 183 Second, although the special provision in article
17 gives the Assembly authority to make financial arrangements
with specialized agencies, the Organization is without power to
make such arrangements with outside organizations. 1
84
Reference to documents of the United Nations Conference on
International Organization (UNCIO), at which the United Nations
Charter was negotiated and drafted, 185 confirms these conclusions.
SYSTEM: COORDINATING ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WORK 14-15 (1978). The only specialized
agency to go out of existence was the International Relief Organization in 1952. See id. at 33.
178. See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 181-94 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 195-206 and accompanying text.
181. Article 17, para. 3 provides: "The General Assembly shall consider and approve
any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57
and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to
making recommendations to the agencies concerned." U.N. CHARTER art. 17, para. 3.
182. Id. para. 1. See supra text accompanying note 47.
183. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text (differences between United Na-
tions organs and other bodies). A system of independent, separately financed specialized
agencies was created under the Charter so that the United Nations might remain flexible as a
security organization, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, COORDINATION OF
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES 9 (1948), and avoid the fiscal problems that centralization
had caused for the League of Nations. J. STOESSINGER, supra note 43, at 41-42.
184. Article 17 is the sole Charter provision granting any budgetary authority. See supra
note 46 and accompanying text.
185. The United Nations Conference on International Organization (also known as the
San Francisco conference) was convened in 1945. Conference documents are collected in
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION DOCUMENTS (U.N.C.I.O.
Docs.) (1945).
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At the conference, a question arose whether existing budgetary
provisions'8" were "broad enough to cover various financial and
budgetary arrangements which it may be necessary for the Organi-
zation to make with existing and future specialized international
agencies."' 8 17 One delegate suggested that the general budgetary
authority was sufficiently broad to include approval of "subsidies to
social and economic organizations."' 188 This view was rejected. 18 9
The present express grant of authority to "approve any financial
and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies" 90 was the
direct result.'""
As the Assembly is without power, express or implied, to fi-
nance the activities of outside organizations other than specialized
agencies, it may not grant subsidies to the Preparatory Commission
so long as the Commission remains an outside organization.1 2 This
restriction is not connected to the General Assembly's apportioning
authority;9 3 the Assembly simply has no power to disburse United
Nations funds for such a purpose. l4
186. The provisions contained in article 17, paragraph 1 had already been substantially
settled. See Doc. 471, II/1/A.1, 8 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 531, 534 (1945) ("The budgets of the
Organization shall be submitted to the General Assembly for consideration and approval.").
Cf. supra text accompanying note 47 (text of article 17, paragraph 1).
187. Doc. 594, 11/1/28, 8 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 398, 400 (1945). The question was raised by
the drafting subcommittee of the Committee on Economic and Social Cooperation, which
recommended that the General Assembly be empowered "to grant subsidies to specialized
organizations." Doc. WD 10, II/3/A/2, 10 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 376, 377 (1945). The full
committee referred the matter to the Committee on Structure and Procedure. Doc. WD 18,
III3/A/3, 10 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 380, 381 (1945).
188. Id. at 401 (statement of the delegate of Belgium). Another delegate expressed the
view that the United Nations should have no power to grant subsidies. Id. (statement of the
delegate of Australia).
189. Committee II/1 referred the matter to its drafting subcommittee, id., which
altered the text to specifically provide that the General Assembly could make "financial and
budgetary arrangements" with specialized agencies. See Doc. 631, 11/1/30, 8 U.N.C.I.O.
Does. 418, 418 (1945).
190. U.N. CHARTER art. 17, para. 3. See supra note 181 (text of article 17, paragraph 3).
191. Doc. 631, 11/1/30, 8 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 418 (1945). The amended text was adopted
without further comment by the Coordination Committee. Doc. WD/437, CO/201, 17
U.N.C.I.O. Does. 306, 322 (1945).
192. See supra notes 157-80 and accompanying text.
193. U.N. CHARTER art. 17, para. 2. Disbursement is a matter anterior to apportion-
ment. See Certain Expenses, 1962 I.C.J. at 158.
194. This is a limitation of the General Assembly's budgetary power. See U.N. CHARTER
art. 17, para. 1.
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C. Specialized Agencies
Even if the Preparatory Commission should enter into an
agreement with ECOSOC for specialized agency status, the United
States obligation is doubtful. The General Assembly is expressly
authorized to make financial arrangements with specialized agen-
cies, 195 and these arrangements may include direct subsidies.1 6 But
this is not the end of the inquiry; it must still be determined
whether such subsidies constitute "expenses of the Organization." 1
9 7
Again, the UNCIO documents are significant because they reveal
awareness of a distinction in principle between regularly budgeted
expenses of the Organization and subsidies to specialized agen-
cies."19 The latter are not "expenses of the Organization," but sim-
ply expenditures to finance the "expenses" of the agency which
authorizes and directs the funded activities."99 The Assembly used
the phrase "expenses of the Preparatory Commission" even as it
approved the subsidy.200
The same result was reached by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in his
separate opinion in Certain Expenses.20 1 He noted that a resolution
usually provides for some action to be taken. Although member
states are obliged to contribute financially, the resolution retains its
195. Id. art. 17, para. 3. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
197. U.N. CHARTER art. 17, para. 2. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
198. The budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies were originally to be made
with ECOSOC along with the other arrangements agreed upon for specialized agency status.
See Doe. 823, 11/3/55, 10 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 228, 233-34 (1945); see also U.N. CHARTER arts.
57, 63; Doc. WD 427, CO/191, 17 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 192 (1945) (transfer from ECOSOC
section of draft Charter to General Assembly section). It was decided that it would be more
logical to vest such authority in the General Assembly because the Assembly was to have all
other financial authority. See Doc. 823, supra, at 233. Furthermore, the Belgian delegate's
expectation that subsidies to specialized agencies would be included in the regular budget of
the Organization without special provision in the Charter was not realized. See supra notes
188-89. Inclusion of article 17, paragraph 3 served to authorize subsidies but did not make
them "expenses of the Organization."
199. This approach to defining "expenses of the Organization" is consistent with the
Certain Expenses nexus test as expressed by the Court, see 1962 I.C.J. at 162, and by Sir
Gerald. See id. at 206 (Fitzmaurice, J., separate opinion). Both indicate that costs incurred in
the performance by the Organization of its functions under the Charter constitute "expenses
of the Organization." Id. at 162, 206.
200. "The General Assembly... [a]pproves the financing of the expenses of the Prepar-
atory Commission from the regular budget of the United Nations. ... G.A. Res. 37/66,
para. 9, U.N. Doc. A/Res/37/66 (1982).
201. 1962 I.C.J. at 212-13.
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fundamentally nonobligatory character20 2 because they need not
participate in the execution of the substantive action recom-
mended. 20 3 But the resolution becomes wholly obligatory, Sir
Gerald reasoned, if member states are bound to contribute where
the "action" consists solely of making a payment or other financial
contribution.2 0 4 Sir Gerald concluded that there is "real doubt
whether any financial obligation can arise" in such a case, 20 5 and
pointed out that United Nations practice was to finance such ex-
penditures through voluntary contributions. 206 Although the Gen-
eral Assembly may authorize disbursement of United Nations funds
to subsidize specialized agencies, the expenditures do not constitute
"expenses of the Organization" and are therefore not apportion-
able.
CONCLUSION
Article 17 vests the financial power of the United Nations
exclusively in the General Assembly, 20 7 but that power is not unlim-
ited. The budgetary power provided in paragraph 1 extends only to
expenditures for functions of the principal organs, subsidiary or-
gans, and specialized agencies as defined in the Charter.208 The
apportioning authority granted in paragraph 2 reaches only "ex-
penses of the Organization,' 2 09 defined as expenditures incurred by
principal and subsidiary organs in the performance of their func-
tions under the United Nations Charter. 210 Subsidies to specialized
agencies, although expenditures within the budgetary power,2 1 1 are
not within the apportioning power of the General Assembly. 212
The Preparatory Commission is currently an outside organiza-
tion. 21 3 Consequently, it is beyond the Assembly's budgetary power
202. In general, the Assembly's resolutions may only recommend contributions. See
U.N. CHARTER art. 10.
203. 1962 I.C.J. at 212-13.
204. Id. at 213.
205. Id. at 212.
206. Id. at 213. See J. STOESSINGER, supra note 43, at 19.
207. See supra notes 43-77 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 181-94 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 97-101, 199 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 181, 185-91 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 195-206 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 157-80 and accompanying text.
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to approve financing of the Commission's expenses from the regular
budget of the United Nations.214 If the Commission should acquire
specialized agency status,2 15 the Assembly would be authorized to
approve the expenditures,216 but member nations would still not be
under an obligation to contribute.2 17 In either case, the United
States may properly refuse to pay its share of the Preparatory
Commission's cost.
Patrick J. Hynes
214. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
